Stephen Coleman, Plaintiff in Error, v. The People of the State of New York, 1873
55 N.Y. 81
“Defendant was arrested for receiving pig iron that was taken from the near by iron manufacturer. At trial, the trial court allowed the iron manufacturer to provide testimony regarding some iron railing that he was also missing, that he allegedly saw in defendant's shop. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial and the appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the court reversed and ordered a new trial. The court found that the evidence the iron manufacturer offered regarding the iron railing was improper. The court found that it could not be offered as evidence of another crime defendant may have committed, for which he was not currently on trial. The court rejected the prosecution's argument that, because defendant had explored the iron manufacturer's testimony on cross-examination, the evidence was properly admitted. The court concluded that the evidence did not fall into the exception that evidence of another offense could have been offered to show guilty knowledge” (LexisNexis).
The State vs. Jacob Kaplan, 1900
72 Conn. 635
“Defendant was charged with the theft of copper. At trial, the prosecution's chief witness was defendant's co-defendant. Upon defendant's conviction, he appealed. Defendant contended that he could, at the very most, have been charged with receiving stolen property. The court found that under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1450, the party who received stolen property was treated the same as one who actually stole it. Further, the court found no merit in defendant's charge of jury misconduct. It was not misconduct for the jury to believe portions of the co-defendant's testimony but to reject portions of the testimony that tended to exculpate defendant” (LexisNexis).
Mansbach Scrap Iron Company v. City of Ashland et al., 1930
235 Ky. 265
“The company filed an action in the circuit court asking the circuit court to invalidate a portion of the city's ordinance that required proprietors of junk shops, automobile wrecking shops, and pawn shops to allow the police department to inspect the business at any time. The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court that upheld the validity of the city ordinance. The court noted that the city had an interest in regulating industries, such as the ones enumerated in the regulation, that were potentially dangerous. The court held that it was not unreasonable for the company to be required to yield to measures designed to protect the public interest, such as the inspection required by the ordinance, when the company desired a license to carry on a business that was fraught with potential danger to the public welfare. The court could not say that the condition imposed was so arbitrary or irrational or that it transgressed into an unreasonable search of the company's business” (LexisNexis).
 from Junk Dealing and Juvenile Delinquency (1919) | If you know of any relevant court cases not listed here, please share it with us at contact@metaltheft.net. |
UNITED STATES of America v. Edward A. GREER and Alphonse P. Bartkus, 1972
“Defendants were convicted for participating in a conspiracy having the unlawful objectives of stealing from an interstate shipment of copper in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 659, transporting cargo in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2314, and concealing the stolen cargo in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 2315. The court affirmed the district court's judgments of conviction against defendants for participating in the conspiracy and reversed a charge of aiding and abetting against one defendant. The court found the evidence insufficient to sustain the charge of aiding and abetting since defendant had not intended to aid in the post-theft plans and did not know the details of the thieves' travel plans, such as the specific destination of the goods. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy convictions since there was sufficient evidence to show the essential nature of the plan; theft, transportation, and disposition; and defendants' adherence to the plan and the government was not required to show a direct connection between the coconspirators. The court found the prosecutor's comments regarding a defendant's failure to take the stand as harmless” (LexisNexis).
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BETTY MARIE CRAMBLIT et al., Defendants and Appellants, 1978
84 Cal. App. 3d 437
“Defendant junk metal dealers challenged the jury's verdict convicting them of buying water meters from a plainclothes police officer without using due diligence to determine whether the officer had authority to sell meters that belonged to a public utility, an offense criminalized under Cal. Penal Code § 496a. Defendants bought the meters as scrap metal without ascertaining the seller's identity or authority to sell the meters. Defendants also selectively omitted the seller's name and address from certain business records. Defendants were given misdemeanor sentences reduced to probation. On appeal, the court held that Cal. Penal Code § 496a was not a strict liability offense and that the jury had not been instructed that it was. Cal. Penal Code § 496a was not void for vagueness because the statutory phrase "ordinarily used by" an entity "engaged in furnishing public utility service" gave a person of reasonable intelligence notice of the prohibited conduct. The state's use of expert testimony to establish defendants' lack of due diligence was not prejudicial error. The court affirmed defendants' convictions" (LexisNexis).
TENNESSEE SCRAP RECYCLERS ASSOCIATION, METAL MANAGEMENT MEMPHIS, LLC, and H. ISKIWITZ & CO., INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHIL BREDESEN, Governor of the State of Tennessee, THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, WILLIE HERENTON, Mayor of the City of Memphis, LARRY A. GODWIN, Chief of Police for the City of Memphis, and WILLIAM L. GIBBONS, in his official capacity as District Attorney for the Thirtieth Judicial District, Defendants-Appellees, 2009
556 F.3d 442
“Plaintiff scrap metal dealers appealed from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee the denial of a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement by defendant government officials of Memphis, Tenn., Code of Ordinance § 6-40 (2008), which required, inter alia, plaintiffs to tag and hold scrap metal they acquired for 10 days, and the denial of their motion for partial summary judgment on the constitutionality of the law. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Neither of plaintiffs' commerce clause theories was persuasive. Plaintiffs failed to show how the "tag and hold" provision discriminated against out-of-state interests. It was not the sort of protectionist local legislation that was per se invalid under the dormant commerce clause. Without a showing of harm to the national scrap metal market, no dormant commerce clause concern was raised. Also, the provision had demonstrable independent value as a law enforcement device, and any burden on interstate commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to its local benefits. The "tag and hold" provision did not constitute a taking of plaintiffs' property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment either as a physical taking or a regulatory taking. The requirement to pay by check or money order did not infringe upon federal authority to coin money or on the status of U.S. currency as legal tender because the law did not make the instruments themselves legal tender. Plaintiffs were not entitled to either a preliminary injunction or a partial summary judgment" (LexisNexis).
Alabama Recycling Association, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 2009
24 So. 3d 1085
“A recycling association challenged a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court (Alabama) that was entered in favor of a city in the association's action for a judgment declaring the existence of a conflict between Ala. Code § 13A-8-30 (the Act) and Montgomery, Ala., Ordinance No. 3-2008, and for injunctive relief. Section 13A-8-30 regulated secondary metals recycling. The ordinance addressed the detrimental impact that copper thefts and illegal trade in stolen copper had on citizens. The court disagreed that the Act and the ordinance conflicted. The fact that the Act did not regulate copper purchases of $ 100 or less did not create a conflict with the ordinance, which did regulate such purchases. The ordinance enlarged on the provisions of the Act by adding restrictions. The check issuance portion of the ordinance did not prohibit anything the Act expressly permitted or permit anything the Act expressly prohibited. Even assuming that the ordinance applied to new and salvaged copper, the ordinance did not conflict with the Act--the phrase "metals that have served their original economic purpose" was part of the definition of secondary metals recycler and references to whom the provisions of the Act applied and not the definition of nonferrous metals. Had the legislature intended to occupy the entire field of regulating the sale of used metals, the legislature could have easily stated that the Act was to be exclusive" (LexisNexis).